Life advice from my politics professor

It’s that time of the year again: seniors busy checking things off their bucket list, in a desperate attempt to take in as much as college-memory as they can; professors looking into those fresh grads’ eyes and see all those previous students’ images. Different skin colors/names/looks, but same inside: ambitious, competitive typical Princeton students eager to please and leave their marks in this world. In line of that, I thought the advice given by my Chinese Politics professor was really worth sharing. He certainly trodded an unconventional path: after graduating with honors from Princeton Politics department, he went on to work for Bains, then the World Bank, before going to Yale for grad school. Now he’s a young assistant professor here in his alma mater lol. (I cited his background precisely because I feel this path holds a strong appeal for me! Academia and stuff, surrounding myself with smart and young minds all the time? sounds great. )

Anyways, here’s the list of things he wanted us to take away with:

1. Embrace the energy of the place. There is nothing like it.
2. Develop relationships with people. This might end up being more important than your classes.
3. Acquire skills.
4. Fail at something. Take courses outside of your “comfort zone.” [though he never did…but he wished he could have taken maths here cuz it’s all what he does now!]
5. Don’t be intimidated by your classmates, you are here for a reason.
6. Your 20s are a testing ground for your future career. Try out different jobs, organizations, and industries.
7. Don’t go straight to graduate school. You will get a lot more out if you get some experience first.
8. A job/career is not a “mission statement” or a slogan on a website. It is the people around you, and what you do with your time.
9. Find a job that allows you to learn. If you look back at the last 6 months, and are no longer learning, think about moving on.
10. Take risks now. It will get harder later in life. Contribute to the world around you in some way.

Especially #8: working in a renowned company but doing repetitive, trivial work, versus working in a lesser known place but actually learning stuff? The point is you have to be learning and ask yourself every six months if you are still learning as much! If not, maybe it’s time to move on.

Despite sounding a bit cheesy, all the aforementioned points kinda make sense to me. Make sure to revisit them from time to time!

无题

人越老，越不喜欢结识新朋友。那种走心的，感觉可以彼此交底的朋友。毕竟介绍自己的过去很累的。

可遇见你那天，我竟想着要把我的前半生拍成电影给你看，让你看看我见过的但尼丁的雪，我走过的四下无人的街，和我度过的烂醉如泥的夜，把所有你未能参与的人生补齐。

以及，今天在知乎上看到的，写得特别有意思的小诗：

花红柳绿春风又起

不及你裙角万分之一甜蜜

二十多岁的你轻轻一笑

是我赖以为生的春药

挑一个有雨有酒的晚上

你摸我的长短我称你的重量

没羞没臊

生成一汪祸水或是风流少年郎

你有你的围裙 我有我的书房

我赚钱 你煲汤

我们终会老 儿女终会有自己的地方

你在摇椅上读一份不知道看了多少遍的报

我拿着药瓶想不起今天该吃几片药

你还记得我的黑皮衣 我还记得你的裙子长

你的眼还是像年轻时一样水汪汪

我的心依然滚烫

（来自@Mr NeverDie）

Censorship in China: Occlumency Done Right

[It’s an article for my politics class, discussing the effectiveness of China’s censorship policy, and manipulation effort as large.]

Since reporting the massive wealth accumulated by the family of China’s Prime Minister Wen Jiabao in October 2012, the New York Times’ English and Chinese-language websites have been blocked by the infamous Great Firewall. Yet, recently on April 6, 2015, online magazine Quartz reported that the New York Times is quietly pushing a new strategy to evade censorship in China and expand its reach[1]. As the Chinese viewership rebounded strongly according to the Times[2], it’s not difficult to deduce that many Chinese readers have the technical know-hows to circumvent the government control and reach the censored stories.

Given the observation, one can’t help but wonder if the censorship measures used by the Chinese government are effective. As a response to both the news article and the lecture on manipulation, this paper argues that censorship measures in China are still largely effective, because the tech-savvy group is small in absolute numbers and is not the main target of the Great Firewall, and the government is constantly upgrading its techniques and arsenals to better adapt to technology and more effective censorship.

Censorship is defined in class as “suppression of expression and information”, and is usually used as part of the ruling party’s manipulation effort to cultivate sympathetic public opinion. In this case, the CCP organized a complex effort, dubbed the “Great Firewall” or formally the Golden Shield Project, to prevent Chinese netizens from accessing certain sensitive sites and searching for blacklisted keywords.

To “climb over the Great Firewall”, the New York Times is employing clever tactics to circumvent the tight control. According to the Quartz article, the NYTimes is simultaneously using new technologies such as mirroring (making multiple copies available on different “mirror” sites), promoting mobile apps (as censors tend to react much slower to apps on App Store), publishing on Chinese social media under different accounts, and collaborating with local media (for instance, selling them the right to run NYTimes stories on their ends). And this multi-pronged approach is clearly paying off: Craig Smith, the Times’ marketing director claimed “millions” of unique users per month for its Chinese-language version.

It really appears that the NYTimes has successfully defied the Great Firewall and reached the hands of millions of, if not more, Chinese netizens – and the Chinese government’s censorship attempt simply flounders under the foreign media’s technical dexterity, thus seems ineffective. But is the picture really this simple?

Accessing the NYTimes requires a certain level of familiarity with technology and workarounds – it is not immediately obvious that an average Chinese netizens would want to take the extra effort to reach those “suspicious” news outlets (as seen from the public opinion research, the average Chinese trust the country’s official news channels a lot more). Moreover, putting against the backdrop of the vast number of Chinese netizens online (618 million as of December 2013[3]), those “millions” of foreign-media viewers don’t seem that significant. In fact, I’d go so far as to say the readers the NYTimes has reached are not the bulk of the target audience that the censorship is designed to capture. Those who can “climb over the Great Firewall” are already well educated and sophisticated enough to form their own judgments, and it takes much more effort to manipulate their opinions. Between laboring hard to impress a small number of educated urban elites and spending a reasonable but less amount of effort to sway the vast majority of typical Chinese netizens, the choice for the party propaganda organ seems clear. Therefore, despite the NYTimes’ (temporary) triumph over the censorship, we still can’t readily claim the defeat of the censorship.

On the other hand, censorship effort in China is still going strong, and has been very effective in shaping the majority’s minds. As we discussed earlier the link between censorship and manipulation, we can look at the public opinion poll to get a sense of the CCP’s success in manipulation, thus indirectly evaluating its success with censorship. During the class lecture on April 20^th, we learnt that people in China trust the central government, believe in the CCP and the have great faith in the general trajectory of the country; moreover, the quotes shown in lecture on April 8^th reflected a general perception among everyday Chinese: the government takes care of its people, the official newspapers speak for the people, and foreign media have their own agenda and are untrustworthy. The party has effectively constructed a desired reality by limiting people’s access to foreign media and journalists’ coverage of certain events, thus successfully portrayed a very positive image of itself.

Moreover, even the Quartz article acknowledges that the NYTimes is playing a “cat-and-mouse” game, as its mirror sites are too often shutdown and its social media accounts quickly discovered and censored. The swift response of the censorship authority shows that it is very effective in cutting foreign media’s defiant voices off.

But at the end of the day, most Chinese netizens probably don’t care about the censorship and the “hide-and-seek” war between the propaganda organ and freedom-loving media. For example, after Facebook and Twitter were banned permanently, people simply switched to homebrewed copycats of those social media and feel just fine[4].

In addition, perhaps even those sophisticated “millions” are now target of the pervasive censorship and the larger manipulation effort. Recently, the Chinese propaganda department released an app that features Xi Jinping’s remarks and works, in order to influence Chinese netizens and promote socialism with Chinese, in an attempt to keep up with the changing online demographics and better reach the younger generations[5]. The party is also tightening its grip on religious minorities. On April 3^rd, the Tibet party chief Chen Quanguo proposed that temples must be “propaganda centers”, and should be equipped with news room, “where monks and nuns learn to ‘revere’ science and appreciate the party’s love”[6]. It’s clear that the party is trying its very best to co-opt religious personnel for its own propaganda work and expand its mind-control.

In summary, since the audience of NYTimes’s Chinese edition is probably not the target of the government’s censorship effort and the number pales in comparison to the total number of Chinese netizens, and the public opinion poll hugely favors the government, it’s perhaps more convincing to conclude that the government’s censorship effort is effective. And it’s innovating with the development of technology and the changing profile of its target audience.

Contrary to President Clinton’s belief that “liberty will spread by cell phone and cable modem” and that any attempt to control the Internet in China would be “like trying to nail Jell-O to the wall”, China has done the impossible and nailed the Jell-O. But can it continue to enjoy its success? Only time will tell.

[1] How the New York Times is eluding censors in China, http://qz.com/374299/how-the-new-york-times-is-eluding-chinas-censors/ ,last accessed on April 21, 2015.

[2] Ibid.

[3]第33次CNNIC报告：网民规模与结构特征, http://tech.163.com/14/0117/00/9IOHA8QU000915BF_all.html , last accessed on April 21, 2015.

[4] And this indifference probably explains the anxiety of Zuckerberg in getting back to the China market. See China’s Great Firewall: Fortune at the expense of freedom? http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/25/asia/china-internet-censorship-kristie-lu-stout/ last accessed on April 21, 2015.

[5] New app collects Xi’s wisdom, http://www.icrosschina.com/2015/0402/10882.shtml last accessed on April 21, 2015.

[6] Tibet party boss says temples must be propaganda centers, http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN0MU0DO20150403?irpc=932 last accessed on April 21, 2015.

春风十里

抱着你睡觉，我连呼吸也变得小心翼翼，生怕打搅你。

没有所谓对的时间对的人，“爱”也不是一个binary的状态。爱情相关程度深浅，进入时很美好，但我更想用心经营，常爱常新。

感谢你，让我每一天都想成为更好的自己。

China’s Strategy during “Occupy Central” – Where Attrition Strategy Really Shines

[It’s the second piece I wrote for my Chinese politics class, discussing the CCP’s strategies in quelling the unrest in HK. ]

In Fall 2014, Hong Kong, whose democracy was once hailed as the model for Asian countries, made headlines when massive civil disobedience movement broke out. Coming to be known as the “Occupy Central with Peace and Love” and later the Umbrella Movement, the protests took place largely in response to the mainland Chinese government’s decision to meddle in Hong Kong’s electoral reform and to protect universal suffrage. After three months, the crowd dispersed in December 2014.

This response paper seeks to briefly categorize China’s strategies in dealing with the “Occupy Central” movement, as a response to the lecture topic “Manage Contestation from Below”, and at the same time append a very brief discussion of their effectiveness.

The topic is particularly of interest as we’ve covered the 1989 Tiananmen Protest in lecture as well, and it’s fascinating to learn how much the CCP has learnt its lesson and how well it responds to a domestic crisis in this day and age. On a larger scale, the CCP’s strategies might be especially enlightening for other authoritarian countries seeking to quell local unrest. In detailing CCP’s strategies (or the change thereof), we might be able to glean insights on the CCP’s evolving understanding of the Chinese/HK society and perhaps derive knowledge about CCP’s ruling philosophy – or Xi’s governing ideology.

I have concluded 6 tactics used by the CCP from the press coverage, with the last one deduced from words on the street. And perhaps unsurprisingly, they all center around one core strategy.

First and foremost, the CCP internally made its stance unequivocally clear very early on. Based on Reuters and several other sources, the National People’s Congress Security Commission (NPCSC) chaired by Xi Jinping decided not to give any concessions in early October, thus clarifying any lingering doubts inside the party and preventing any serious miscommunications from happening.

Secondly, the CCP opted for close collaborations with the Hong Kong authority, instead of taking the driver’s seat. According to The New York Times China correspondents, during the peak of the movement, mainland officials met Hong Kong officials in charge of dealing with the protest daily in a neighboring City, Shenzhen, in a resort owned by the central government liaison office. Information could flow unhindered between the two sides in real time, which in turned ensured effective communications and the successful execution of CCP’s strategies.

Moreover, perhaps as expected, CCP almost immediately started online censorship – their usual tactic -when the first sign of trouble started to surface. At the onset of the protest, China’s censorship organ told online and offline media that “All websites must immediately clear away information about Hong Kong students violently assaulting the government and about ‘Occupy Central.’ Promptly report any issues. Strictly manage interactive channels, and resolutely delete harmful information. This [directive] must be followed precisely.”[1] Most Chinese websites didn’t run stories at all in the first place; and for those few who did, the stories usually focused on the negative side of the movement. BBC was blocked after one video showing violence used by police on a protestor went viral online; CNN’s service was also disrupted. At the same time, keywords such as “Hong Kong”, “barricades”, “Occupy Central” and “umbrella” raised red flags during search or on social media, which generally prompted administrators to delete them shortly. This tactic has time and again proven effective as most Chinese readers rely on mainstream media for daily news; once the event is censored, there is hardly any easily accessible channel for an average Chinese netizens to acquire latest information, let along laymen on the street who may or may not read newspapers.

Relating to the abovementioned point, we see that the CCP has utilized propaganda to make favorable pronouncements and portray the Occupy Movement in a negative, disruptive tone. Perhaps knowing it was impossible for people not to notice such a large-scale movement and casting itself in a good light, the CCP consciously asked mainland media to report the movement as causing a lot of financial loss and inconvenience in the city, while suppressing any ideological or political significance of the movement. It has also actively sought verbal and written endorsement and support from the elite class, including the richest people and the opposition camp, to show that the CCP’s position and plan were legitimate.

Another tried-and-true tactic used by China here is its allegation of foreign intervention. It never fails to point the finger at the so-called hostile foreign powers so as to shift people’s attention away from the true root cause of the event. For instance, the first Chinese official to address Hong Kong about NPCSC’s decision, Li Fei, accused protestors of being tools used by Western hostile powers, which were trying to undermine the authority of the CCP[2]. The People’s Daily linked the movement to Taiwan’s Sunflower Student Movement and accused the Occupy Central protestors of seeking support from both the United Kingdom and the United States[3]. By doing this, the CCP sought to undermine the legitimacy and the appeal of the movement, and to provoke patriotism to fight this movement.

In addition, CCP was accused of supporting the opposition camp substantially, such as helping it organize opposition rallies, gather petitions against Occupy Central and put pressure on business tycoons to pick a side. Rumors also suggested the alleged push behind the mobilized triads and gangsters: local gangsters were involved in the protest and clashed with protestors, and they might be receiving help or hint from the Chinese government.

Yet these tactics do not come out haphazardly without some internal linking. In fact, they all fall neatly under one bigger, umbrella strategy that was effectively deployed by the Chinese government: the attrition strategy. It was very clear that the government has been very patient and refrained repeatedly from directly intervening[4], but opted for a behind-the-scene role, from the very beginning. The CCP has clearly internalized its lesson from Tiananmen, where it learnt that open confrontation and bloody conflicts would only make it an easy target for freedom fighters and get crucified in the international arena; it also learnt the weakness of a student movement: give it some time and internal cracks will appear. But by deliberately delaying response and taking a more subtle line, it could avoid escalating the situation and colliding head-on with the protesting students, while shifting blame to the HK authorities when necessary. What’s more, under this strategy, China has clearly seen and subsequently tried to utilize the internal crack among the protestors – it astutely realized that students, intellectuals, ordinary citizens are not one single entity, but different groups with slightly different priorities and sometimes competing interests. It also used the dissatisfaction on the ground, to win some people over – so that it didn’t appear to be the CCP vs. Hong Kong, but rather an internal debate among Hong Kongers; minimize the drama and headlines, so as to create opportunity to wait for the protestors to wear out and get tired and kick each other out. It is thus Beijing’s calculations to cool down the controversy through time and let internal differences develop, which eventually would kill the protest’s momentum and legitimacy, given the huge cost to the economy[5].

In conclusion, we see that China has taken a relatively less violent path this time and it has clearly worked, since there were no international sanctions, no blood, nor was there any concession made. Given the apparent effectiveness of such attrition strategy, it wouldn’t surprise me if other authoritarian countries decide to follow China’s course. Yet we have to realize the unique condition here that makes this strategy so effective: Hong Kong is tiny and relatively insulated from the rest of China, hence the movement couldn’t really snowball into a much bigger one. Also the protestors set out to be non-violent, hence the potential risk for the government is small and the economic cost made the use of attrition strategy obvious.

As an endnote, there are multiple directions this response paper can take:

1. Now having understood the CCP’s strategies better, we can perhaps ask what could the students and the Scholarism do to combat CCP’s strategy and to win concessions? Or should they not launch the civil disobedience movement at all?
2. New Angle: compare student movements and investigate the cause of their failures. Put Occupy Central and Tiananmen in juxtapose, discuss the inherent difficulties and then propose ways to overcome it. Or discuss the differences they have, and how they lead to different responses from the government and how that affects their eventual success/failure.
3. Would the movement be better if it’s restricted to just students? Not involving general public, and limited to just one or two strongholds?

Reference:

Lee, Raymond. “Al Jazeera Center for Studies – Reports – Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement.” Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement. Al Jazeera Center for Studies – Reports, 11 Nov. 2014. Web. 07 Apr. 2015.

Acknowledgement:

The author would like to express his gratitude to Mary Hui ’17, whose brilliant writing and insights on the 2014 Hong Kong Protests have helped the author greatly when formulating a response.

[1] Paul Carsten (29 September 2014). “China censors try to blunt Hong Kong protests, don’t always succeed”. Reuters. Retrieved 7 April 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/29/us-hongkong-china-internet-idUSKCN0HO1KV20140929

[2] Buckley, Chris & Forsythe, Michael (31 August 2014). “China Restricts Voting Reforms for Hong Kong”. The New York Times. Archived from the original on 7 April 2015.

[3] 香港佔中 中國怪罪台灣太陽花學運 [China blames Sunflower Student Movement for Occupy Central]. Liberty Times (in Chinese). 30 September 2014. Retrieved 7 April 2015.

[4] Josh Noble and Julie Zhu, “Hong Kong ‘lucky’ China Has not Stopped Protests, Says CY Leung”, The Financial Times, 2014-10-20. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3f6f1c74-584b-11e4-a31b-00144feab7de.html#axzz3H5KRCO9W  Last accessed on 7 April 2015

[5] http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2014/11/201411119524559672.htm, last accessed on 7 April 2015.

Air Pollution in China (Under the Dome): who’s behind this documentary?

[Below is a response paper I wrote for my Chinese Politics class this year, analyzing the motives behind the sensational documentary Under the Dome by Chai Jing. Happy reading!]

Recently, a documentary called “Under the Dome” has provoked much discussion in China – within three days of its release, it had achieved 150 million views on Tencent. Financed, produced, and narrated by a former CCTV journalist Chai Jing, the documentary seeks to explore the nature, root causes and effects of China’s air pollution, particularly the smog. Yet given the stringent media censorship in China, the fact tat this documentary was posted and broadcasted and reached millions was exceptional: it openly criticized state enterprise in energy sector, the steel industry and coal producers, while exposing the ineptitude of the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP).

It’s hard to imagine that such a negative-publicity documentary could be approved at the first place by the CCP, not to mention that it actually received highly positive coverage on the party-owned People’s Daily[1]. Is the documentary actually (covertly) backed by the government? Or is it just a personal effort from Chai Jing, but happened at an opportune time? Taking a closer look at the documentary and the bigger context, I conclude that it’s the confluence of both personal motives and the push from the government that made the documentary and its airing possible.

Chai Jing implied, in the beginning of her presentation, that she started making the documentary when her then unborn daughter developed a tumor in the womb, and she blames air pollution for that. And in 22:30, she explicitly stated that “it’s a personal battle between me and air pollution”. Though Chai never actually established the causal link between smog and her daughter’s condition, she implied the relationship more than once, and used emotional appeals in her presentation. Hence it’s easily imaginable that being a mother and feeling personally victimized, she has a very strong personal reason behind the making of the documentary.

Yet at the same time, there are many signs insinuating that the documentary is possibly endorsed by the government.

First, as shown by Chai Jing’s wide access to numerous government officials in different places (mostly Shanxi and Beijing) and the help she received, it’s hard to believe it’s a purely personal endeavor. As a retired journalist, Chai didn’t have official pass/access when fielding interview requests; all she could use, we’d imagine, is her personal network. Yet the fact that she could get to numerous high-ranking officials in the MEP and NPC leads us to conclude that her influence is bigger than assumed. Moreover, numerous professors offered expert opinions and lab reports, and provided data, such as labs in Peking University and Tsinghua University, and Wang Yuesi from Chinese Academy of Sciences. Zhang Dawei, inspector from MEP Bureau of Environmental Protection, went with Chai Jing to Tangshang to inspect factory emission using a drone. She was also in the scene of random inspection at a tollgate outside Beijing, with a group of officials, at 40:30. How did she get all the access and support?

Perhaps because it’s a just cause she’s promoting/investigating and the officials resonated and wanted to help? Perhaps it’s because she’s really famous and the officials felt the pressure and couldn’t say no? Or perhaps, the officials received some sort of hint from their superiors? It’s unfathomable that the notoriously risk-averse Chinese officials would risk their careers for a retired journalist, no matter how famous she is (or used to be) and how important the issue is (there are other social justice issues screaming for attention too).

Related to the above argument, it’s likely that the officials know fully well what they are doing, judging from the honest opinions expressed and the huge amount of information they chose to share. For example, Xiong Yuehui, head of the MEP Department of Science, Technology and Standards, candidly explained the embarrassing situation for China’s environmental law enforcement, called steel industry as acting with “utter recklessness” and sketched the economic dilemma faced his department, while admitting his employers are basically toothless and ineffective. Li Kunsheng, Director of Beijing Municipal Environment Protection Bureau, Vehicular Emissions Department, at 43:50, admitting that fake cars are everywhere and the bureau is aware of the severity and hasn’t done anything. Moreover, Ding Yan, an official from MEP, explained that the unclear law authority as stated in the air pollution law was made purposely vague by NPC to balance different interests, admitting of not doing their best and being toothless. The abnormal openness runs contrary to the restrain and conservativeness of typical Chinese officials, and just seems very odd. But it would be immediately sensible if we assume they acted on some hints from the higher-ranking officials.

Moreover, given the widespread media censorship, the way the entire episode unfolded tells an interesting story. The documentary first went public on February 28 on people.cn, the website of the government-backed People’s Daily. It even published an interview with Chai Jing and quoted reactions from Chen Jining, the recently-appointed minister for environmental protection, who praised the film and compared its significance with Silent Spring, the 1962 book by US environmentalist Rachel Carson. And later all mainstream media reported or reposted the documentary. Such high profile and exposure is highly unusual for a self-financed documentary with highly sensitive political content, and I think it’s reasonable to infer that it is the voice the government endorsed. However, five days later, the documentary was abruptly pulled from all mainstream platforms and deleted on people.cn as well. It might be that the government feels the discussions are enough and it doesn’t want the situation to go out of control; it has served its purpose. But the duration for which it stayed alive impressed a lot, and probably points to the (tacit) official endorsement.

Against a bigger economic backdrop, it fits Xi’s political need to quash “tigers” from the oil industry, and possibly open ground for reform and re-structuring in the energy sector. Xi might use this documentary to crack the highly opaque and lucrative industry, and eliminate his opponents from that sector.

However, all the above are merely speculations, and might fall for the trap of fallacious conspiracy. It could be Chai’s personal motive mainly, and she might just have picked a really good time. During Chen Jining’s press conference on March 7^th, none of the journalists asked about “Under the Dome” – the silence probably signaled a lack of official endorsement[2] The chronological order of events also seems less than optimal: if the government officials wanted to galvanize the public and garner support, it could have waited for the documentary to come out first and then purge the “tigers” from the oil industry, name a new minister for environmental protection and pass bills in NPC; yet what happened was that Chen Jining was appointed on Jan 30[3], long before the documentary was aired. And oil industry has long seen some of its top officials purged, such as Jiang Jiemin in September, 2013. The documentary didn’t seem to be used as a political weapon in this regard.

In addition, Rumors online have it that when the documentary was first made ready, no platforms were willing to take the risk to broadcast it, pointing to the lack of government support or at least the clear signal.

Yet, when so many unusual events and characteristics converge, I tend to believe the documentary was made possible due both personal motives and push from some government officials, for the unusual access Chai enjoyed and the honesty and openness many have showed in the video. Regardless of the nature of the documentary, one thing is clear: blue sky is in everyone’s best interest, and we are all responsible for the environmental legacy that we pass down to the future generations.

[1] Though there’s a joke saying that the People’s Daily is right every day, but you just can’t read the annual bound volume of the newspaper.

[2] http://www.smh.com.au/world/chen-jining-chinas-environment-minister-ignores-pollution-documentary-20150308-13y5g0.html, last accessed on Mar 26, 2015.

[3] http://english.cntv.cn/2015/01/30/VIDE1422560636775437.shtml last accessed on Mar 26, 2015.

Meeting Takatoshi Ito (one of the architects of Abenomics)

What is Abenomics?

1/ Monetary policy -> quantitative easing with inflation targeting (2%); yen depreciated, stock markets appreciated, changed mood completely. Monetary policy is thus important!

2/ Fiscal policy: first implemented stimulus package; then implemented VAT (consolidation) (consumption tax hike); (Abe delayed the second rates hike by 1.5 years, so not until April 2017)

3/ Growth strategy: how economic growth can be accounted for by the production function, y=AF(K,L). K: capital; L: labor; A: technology/innovation. The key for K is the efficient use of capital. For L, Japan needs more workers.

Is it working? No one really knows for sure, despite the list of impressive achievements on Abe’s website. But Japan’s inflation has been staying positive, so that’s perhaps a good indication?

你遇见那个人，就好像你丢掉的另一半。

认识他之前，你住在南极或者格陵兰岛，全世界的人都和你有时差。
你说的话，他们过了宿，搁凉了，摆馊了，也就忘记了。
而这个人不一样，他和你在同一个经纬。

你见到他的一瞬间，感情、印象都已经储备到位，
只等你轻触那个天亮的开关。
你说的每一句话他都懂得，你开一个话题他就明白，
你交待一下关键词他就能感知到方位。

这真是一个盛大的奇迹

Bahamian sunset (@Long Wharf, Nassau)

About Internships

The past two weeks is perhaps the most stressful time of my Princeton life so far: walking to Career Service Suite 300 for interviews everyday, writing cover letters, spamming the HireTigers application portal, doing case preps all in search of a summer job.

And the anxiety increased exponentially when all of your friends landed some job offers, mostly from prestigious established brands, and you are still searching.

Sometimes I think of Princeton as a cage of rats – pedaling hard to the limited amount of bread crumbs.

外面的世界很大。暑假可以读书，可以做义工，可以背包看世界。为什么一定要争破头皮进投行，为什么一定要留在曼哈顿？

Reasons why I have problem with the English language…